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Although the Pacific coast of Nicaragua was a center of cotton production 
even in pre-Columbian times and, during the colonial period, was known as a 
source of cotton for sailcloth (MacLeod, 1973:124, 166), the commercial 
development of the crop is largely a phenomenon of the thirty years preceding the 
Sandinist revolution of 1979. In the 1920s W.W. Cumberland (1928:38) noted that 
cotton was produced only in small quantities despite the substantial areas in 
western Nicaragua "admirably suited" to its growth but as late as 1952 the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (.1953: 34, 37) saw. no role 
for cotton in the Nicaraguan economy except as a raw material for a still to be 
developed textile industry and suggested the country concentrate on cattle and 
oil palm. Before 1950 commercial production was sporadic despite considerable 
encouragement by Somoza's National Bank and the few thousand bales exported went 
no further than Guatemala (Keith, 1974:28). From the 1870s until the 1 9 5 0 ~ ~  
Nicaragua continued to rely on coffee as its major foreign exchange earner and 
its major source of domestic wealth. 
After 1950 cot ton production expanded exponentially to become the country's 
major export and, as the National Cotton Commission (1967:2) observed, the 
driving motor ("motor impulsador") of the entire economy. Nicaragua entered an 
unprecedented period of economic growth. Between 1950 and 1977 the agricultural 
sector expanded at an average annual rate of 4.7%, a rate exceeded in Latin 
America only by Venezuela; between 1950 and 1971 agricultural productivity grew 
at an annual rate of 4.6%, the highest in Latin America; in the early 1960s the 
rate of agricultural expansion was the highest in the world (~aumeister, 
1982:25). By 1967 Nicaragua was the largest producer in Central America, the 
eleventh largest in the world, and accounted for 2.4 percent of the world's total 
cotton exports (Belli, 1968:60, 64), an extraordinary figure for a country with a 
population of a little more than two million. 
The speed and magnitude of this "cotton revolution" exerted a profound 
effect on the Nicaraguan economy, class structure and political system and in 
combination with a repressive political system little changed for fifty years 
contributed directly to the successful revolution of 1979. The social and 
political consequences of cotton. cultivation, not only in Nicaragua but elsewhere 
in Central America, are as great or greater than its economic effects and 
contributed to such seemingly unrelated events as the "Soccer War" between El 
Salvador and Honduras in 1969 (Dorner and Quiros, 1973:229) and th'e renewal of 
Guatemala's endless guerrilla war after 1979 (Paige, 1983). 
The effect of this sudden economic transformation was magnified in Nicaragua 
by the relative backwardness of the economy and social structure in the early 
fifties and the failure of earlier lead sectors to stimulate an economic take- 
off. With the exception of Honduras, Nicaragua was in 1950 the most backward 
country in Central America. As late as 1950 there were only 170 miles of paved 
roads in the country (Keith, 1974:170), a total of 500 tractors were in use in 
agriculture (Belli, 1968:.124) and per capita income was less than U.S. $200 
(Keith, 1974:30). After a brief period as a warren for Panamanian slave hunters, 
the colonial economy lapsed into a long stagnation which was not to be broken 
until the development, of the coffee export economy in the late 19th and early 
twentieth centuries. Even coffee exports did not have the transforming effects 
that they did, in different ways, in Guatemala, El Salvador and Costa Rica for 
reasons that have much to do with the special geopolitics of Nicaragua. 
Nicaragua's strategic geographic position set the country on zi trajectory that 
would lead to revolutionary transformation in 1979. 
Nicaragua Before Cotton: Transoceanic Dreams and Agrarian Reality 
From Lake Nicaragua to Brito on the Pacific Coast is a distance of only 
sixteen miles and this narrow strip, the Rivas Isthmus, has made Nicaragua appear 
a promising site for a transoceanic canal from early colonial times. The San 
Juan river is navigable, at least for small craft, from the Caribbean to the lake 
so that only the Rivas Isthmus blocked water borne transit. Indeed during the 
gold rush Cornelius ,Vanderbilt8s Accessory Transit Company brought travelers up 
the San Juan by river launch, across the lake by steamer and down to the Pacific 
by stagecoach (McCullough, 1977:38-39). It was always assumed that if the United 
States built' a canal anywhere it would be in Nicaragua and the country became a 
focus of interimperial rivalry in mid-century when British interest in the-canal 
route led to the annexation of the Miskito coast, friction with the United States 
and, eventually, to the Clayton Bulwer treaty (1850) which defined U.S. and 
British interests in any future canal. In 1902 the switch of only five votes in 
the United States Senate would have led to a Nicaraguan rather than a Panamanian 
Canal (~c~ullou~h, 1977: 324). No other country in Central America, except of 
course Panama itself, has ever been seriously considered as a canal site or has 
been the locus of an important overland transportation route. 
This important economic advantage became a distinct political liability as 
first Spain, then Great Britain and then finally the United States attempted to 
control the strategic passage. William Walker's bizarre "filibustering" 
expedition to Nicaragua (1855-57) was encouraged by dissident partners in 
Accessory Transit and' his eventual defeat was financed by Vanderbilt himself. 
Walker, the only North American ever to hold the presidency of a Latin American 
republic, rose to power in Nicaragua as the byproduct of an internal power 
struggle in a United States corporation (Selser, 1981:ll-20). In the first 
decade of the twentieth century the Liberal Jose Santos Zelaya (1893-1909) began 
negotiating with foreign powers to build a second, competing canal through 
Nicaragua. The United States, taking advantage of Nicaragua's interminable civil 
wars between liberal Leon and conservative Granada intervened to insure its 
control of any future canal and to prevent competition for its own canal in 
Panama (Selser, 1981:26). In 1912 the United States returned once again and 
remained with the exception of one brief period in 1925-1926 until 1933. 
Nicaragua thus experienced the most extended direct military involvement by the 
United States of any country in Latin America except Puerto Rico. 
The long United States military intervention had three consequences of 
decisive importance for the development of the revolutionary movement in the 
1970s and for the development of the Nicaraguan political and economic system. 
First, it created a largely autonomous state based on the Nicaraguan National 
Guard; second, it prevented the consolidation of political power by an agrarian 
bourgeoisie, and third, it led to a devastating guerrilla war which severely 
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impeded the modernization of agriculture. The National Guard, trained and 
initially paid and led by the United States, formed the core of a state which 
reflected the intests of neither the traditional landed oligarchy, the 
modernizing coffee bourgeoisie nor even foreign capital. Its origins were 
strategic and military, not economic. In Guatemala, El Salvador and Costa Rica 
the state was simply the executive committee of the coffee planters association. 
In Honduras it was an extension of American banana companies. In Nicaragua it . 
was a unit of the United States Marine Corps. Anastasio Somoza  arcf fa was 
selected to head the Guard at least in part because of his knowledge of English. 1 
The intervention and the autonomous state left in its wake prevented the 
consolidation of political power by the liberal coffee oligarchy that emerged 
with the rise of the new export crop throughout Central America. The 19th 
century coffee boom had a predictable series of political consequences.2 A 
Liberal revolution (Guatemala 1871, El Salvador 1885, Nicaragua 1893) seized 
power from the remnants of the Conservative colonial elite and constitutional and 
legal revisions established the framework for relatively unencumbered capital 
accumulation. In Guatemala and El Salvador there is a perfect correlation 
between the onset of these liberal reforms and the date at which coffee displaces 
dyestuffs (indigo and cochineal) as the principal export (Cardoso, 1975:15). 
Lands held by the Church, indigenous Indian communities and mestizo 
municipalities, as well as waste lands held by the state and worked in precarious 
tenure, were expropriated, auctioned off and converted into simple commodities. 
Indian rebellions and insurrections by displaced mestizo land holders were 
m 
defeated and poor farmers were converted into a semi-servile labor force for the 
expanding coffee economy. Land, labor and political power secured the coffee 
oligarchs rapidly accumulated wealth sufficient to give them either alone or with 
their allies in the armed forces complete domination over Central American 
society and politics. 
Initially Nicaragua followed this path. Coffee exports began on a large 
scale in the early 1870's and the legal changes in land ownership were set in 
motion even before the liberal revolution. In 1877 the traditional conservative 
oligarchy passed a basic agrarian law which required that lands held by 
indigenous communities be sold at auction and permitted the sale of government 
owned land (Wheelock and ~arri6n, 1981 : 68). The large scale land expropriations 
that followed led in 1881 to a large scale rebellion by indigenous Indian 
communities against the conservative government of Joaquin Zavala (Wheelock, 
1981:109-118). The defeat of the rebellion accelerated the rate of 
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expropriations and the new coffee oligarchy consoldiated its political power with 
the rise of the Zelaya administration in 1893. Rising coffee prices in the first 
two decades of the twentieth century led to more expropriations and a rapid 
expansion of coffee cultivation. The United States intervention and the 
resulting period of political instability and civil war severely handicapped 
further capital accumulation and prevented the transformation of coffee wealth 
into political hegemony. Although the coffee growers attained considerable local 
economic and political power, especially in the Northern coffee growing 
Departments of Jinotega and Matagalpa, they never formed the nucleus of a 
national financial group, never organized their own political party and, of 
course, never managed to rest control of the central government from the national 
guard.3 On the contrary Somoza, using the second world war as a pretext, 
expropriated a large number of German owned estates to make himself the largest 
coffee grower in Nicaragua (Wheelock, 1978:165-166). 
The coffee export economy produced, in all Central American countries except 
Costa Rica, a hybird micro-mode of production which combined external 
participation in the international commodity market with varying degrees of 
extraeconomic coercion in the recruitment and control of the labor force. If the 
relatively free sale of labor power by a labor force deprived of access to 
productive assets, and the reinvestment of economic surplus in the mode of 
production itself are taken as the defining characteristics of the capitalist 
mode, then no Central American coffee system, execept Costa Rica's, was or is 
fully capitalist and the Nicaraguan system was the least capitalist of all. In 
Central American societies the use of force, either direct or indirect, to 
extract economic surplus as tribute, a system which Eric.Wolf (1982:79) has aptly 
termed (after Samir Amin) the "tributary" mode of production, persists in varying 
degrees everywhere (again excepting Costa Rica) and the resulting economic 
formation might be called a commercial manor or hacienda to indicate its hybrid 
character. Variations on the manorial system of feudal Europe are combined with 
various other forms of extraeconomic coercion to provide labor while coffee 
prices are dictated by international markets and varying degrees of reinvestment 
in production technology are present. The liberal transformation created a more 
or less unencumbered market in land and freed labor from its traditional rights 
to independent access to a living from the land. It did not, however, free 
labor. In Guatamala, where the colonial oligarchy was strongest and tributary 
techniques of surplus extraction most highly developed, the liberal reforms 
included the institution of state sanctioned forced labor (1877) which persisted 
with some changes in legal form until 1944. Coffee expansion in Guatemala took 
place outside the major region of indigenous population in the highlands and 
since much of the population retained independent access to land, force was 
necessary to secure labor (Cardoso, 1975:28). In Salvador where dense 
populations were found on the best coffee lands the liberal land expropriations 
deprived much of the population of land access and compelled a high degree of 
proletarianization (Trujillo, 1981:124). It is not surprising to find that the 
only mass Communist insurrection in Latin America occurred among the 
proletarianized coffee workers of Western Salvador during the depression 
(Anderson, 1971:20). In Salvador workers were most fully dependent on market 
forces and were therefore most acutely affected by world economic collapse. No 
similar insurrections occurred in Guatemala or Nicaragua where coffee workers 
could more easily revert to subsistence production on their own minifarms. Costa 
Rica, always the exception in Central America, lacked a powerful tributary 
colonial oligarchy, suffered from a scarcity of labor, not land, and developed a 
coffee export economy based on a numerous class of small holders dominated by a 
few large growers who controlled processing and export with the aid of British 
capital.4 Despite the colonial origins of the coffee elite extra-economic 
coercion was absent even through a vagrancy statute similar to Guatemala's was 
passed in 1883 (Cardoso, 1975: 26). 
In Nicaragua, United States intervention prevented either the complete 
expropriation of the peasantry as in Salvador, the growth of state sanctioned 
forced labor as in Guatemala or the development of a true agrarian bourgeoisie as 
in Costa Rica. From the time of the 1909 U.S. intervention until the 
consolidation of control by Anastasio Somoza Garcia in 1936 no stable economic 
environment existed in Nicaragua. Not only did the intervention block a clear 
liberal revolution but it also prevented the coffee oligarchy from transforming 
the economy to its advantage. 
The armed opposition of ~&sar Augusto Sandino (1926-1933) to the American 
occupation force inhibited capitalist transformations of the coffee system 
especially in the Segovias (North Central Nicaragua) where Sandino was strong and 
coffee production had only recently begun. Faced with opposition from a 
nationalist leader with an uncertain agrarian program but considerable peasant 
support, growers abandoned their efforts to expropriate the peasantry and instead 
left the peasantry in precarious possession of the land to insure a more or less 
stable labor supply (Wheelock and carridn, 1981:72-73). The Nicaraguan mode of 
estate coffee production therefore most closely approached the manorial ideal of 
domain land worked by the land owners with a labor force more or less tied to the 
land. In a study of Masatepe (Department of Masaya, Pacific Coast) Carlos Rafael 
Cabarrus (1977:465) found that as late as 1976 only 5 per cent of the peasantry 
worked exclusively on their own lands. The others were provided with rented land 
by large coffee growers in order to provide a labor stockpile not only for the 
harvest but also for weeding and cultivation during the entire year. In 
Salvador, by contrast, as early as the 1870s coffee growers ceased to provide 
subsistence plots for laborers relying on purchased foodstuffs instead (Cardoso, 
1975:29). Guatemalan growers stockpiled large amounts of labor but by the 1970s 
had begun clearing peasants with subsistence plots from their land and relying 
exclusively on migratory labor now compelled by land scarcity in the Highlands 
rather than direct state coercion (Quan, 1981: 17). In Costa Rica the manorial 
form never established itself. 
The triumph of the manorial form in Nicaraguan coffee was both a cause and a 
consequence of the extraordinary technical backwardness of Nicaraguan production. 
As Jaime Biderman (1983:12) notes: 
Low yielding varieties of coffee were planted, and cultivation 
practices were primitive: excessive shade and limited or no pruning, 
pest control or soil conservation measures. Though a limited amount of 
processing equipment was introduced, the harvesting, transporting and 
processing of coffee remained at very low levels of labor productivity. 
Many of the rudimentary practices did not vary between 1900 and 1950. . 
As a result of these practices and the lack of renovation of the coffee 
plantations yields actually declined at a rate of 4% a year between 
1925-1949. 
Yields in 1957-1958 were half those in Guatemala and only 40 per cent of those in 
Costa Rica and El Salvador. According to Jaime Wheelock (1978:42) of 9603 coffee 
estates in 1961 only 248 used fertilizer and in Nueva Segovia, where Sandino had 
been strongest and reversion to manorial forms pronounced, none used fertilizer. 
Most estates depended on mules to transport coffee; less than ten per cent 
possessed even rudimentary processing equipment; seventy per cent of the 
plantings in the North Central region were arabica varieties unchanged since the 
introduction of the crop (Wheelock, 1978:42-44). In Guatemala in 1964, by 
contrast, only 28 per cent of plantings were the traditional arabica (Borges, 
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1973:208) and many large estates had there own processing factories (beneficios) 
(Biechler, 1970:33). In Costa Rica a network of pickup stations are connected by 
truck with large industrial processing facilities (Seligson, 1982:33). 
Technical backwardness simultaneously decreases land values and increases 
the demand for labor and both of these developments favor regression to the 
manorial form of production organization. Although automation of labor intensive 
harvesting activities has yet to be realized anywhere in the world technical 
changes in cultivation and processing can substanially reduce the demand for 
labor, particulary non-harvest labor. Introduction of higher yield, more robust 
varieties reduces the amount of labor required to care for the plants and time 
wasted in transit from one plant to the next during harvest. The use of 
varieties requiring little or no shade substantially reduces the need for 
constant pruning of shade trees which threaten to cut off sunshine entirely and 
extremly high density plantings can substantially reduce or even eliminate the 
need for weeding as well as saving time during harvest. Use of fertilizers, 
while requiring some additional labor, increases yield per plant thereby 
increasing harvesting efficiency and productivity per unit area. To the .extent 
that all of these changes are introduced the large proportion of labor expended 
in pruning, weeding and cultivating of the groves can be reduced and a large year 
round labor force is unnecessary. All of these developments are very far 
advanced elsewhere in Central America and have made it possible to dispense with 
the stockpiles of labor consuming valuable land on or near the estate itself. 5 
Nicaragua's historical lag in these technical innovations requires a manorial 
system of resident or near resident labor wastefully used in labor extensive 
cultivation during the year. All of these advanced techniques incidentally 
increase yields per unit area making land much too valuable to be left in the 
hands of campesinos and creating further incentives for the elimination of 
semi-manorial f oms. Absence of ' machinery for processing on the estate or the 
good transportation system which makes nearby factory processing practical 
requires that large amounts of labor be expended in inefficient dry processing 
techniques further increasing the need for a large captive labor supply. 
The technical effect of intervention and civil war was to cause the abrupt 
halt in the transformation of the coffee economy from tributary to capitalist 
mode and cause a regression to the manorial form more common in subsistence than 
in market production. This agricultural regression had the paradoxical effect of 
increasing not decreasing political stability in the countryside. Land 
expropriations slowed, peasants were left with some degree of control over land, 
payment in kind rather than cash expanded, economic dependency on the estate 
increased, economic connection with the 0,utside world weakened, transportation 
and communications stagnated, and an agrarian proletariat never emerged 
(Wheelock, 1978:84-103). Sandino had drawn his strength from a peasantry 
displaced by the recent. expansion of the North Central coffee zone and the 
stagnation of the coffee export economy stopped this process and created a 
politically stable social form, the traditonal manor, now producing coffee rather 
than cattle. The commercial manor has seldom been the locus of sustained 
revolutionary movements in agricultural export sectors in the post war period 
although land invasions and other forms of agrarian discontent are not uncommon 
in such systems (Paige, 1975:121-122). Conflicts are more likely between the 
commercial manor and independent peasant cultivators, as was the case in the 
Segovias in the twenties, or in Morelos during the Mexican revolution or in the 
Peruvian Central Sierra in the early sixties.6 Conflicts between dependent manor 
laborers and the seignorial elite are less common. Even these conflicts, 
however, depend on expansion in the export sector, extensive capitalist 
transformation of production or both, and before World War I1 Nicaraguan coffee 
cultivation moved in exactly the opposite direction. There would be little 
reason to expect agrarian revolution from the manorial form that came to dominate 
Nicaraguan coffee, production. Nevertheless, the development of the coffee 
export sector had left in its wake a greatly enlarged semi-proletariat of harvest 
workers, a nucleus of proletarianized workers on larger, more modern Pacific 
coast estates, and, in the hills of the Segovias, memories of heroic peasant 
resistance. But after the assassination of Sandinci in 1934, the Somozas enjoyed 
relative freedom from large scale popular insurrection in either the countryside 
or the cities. The revolution in cotton would change all this. 
The Great Transformation 
If Nicaraguan coffee cultivation was the most backward in Central America, 
Nicaraguan cotton production became, by contrast, the most technically advanced. 
After 1950 a combination of chemical pesticides, high cotton prices and relative 
political stability finally initiated the long postponed capitalist 
transformation of Nicaraguan agriculture. At the time of the revolution this 
. process was very far advanced, although not complete, and not only had market 
forces penetrated all phases of production but mechanization had begun to be 
extended even to harvest activities. Under the right circumstances Nicaraguan 
cotton cultivation might have evolyed toward the completely mechanized chemical 
intensive model of United States cultivation but once again revolution and 
foreign intervention delayed the process. By the late seventies Nicaraguan 
cotton production was a complex hybrid form which might be called the capital 
intensive migratory labor estate. It combined some of the worst features of the 
semi-servile labor of precapitalist production with the unencumbered exploitation 
of fully capitalist enterprise. Nor did this capitalist transformation lead to 
the long delayed liberal revolution by a new cotton bourgeiosie but instead 
created a weak, fragmented economic elite that proved uncertain allies of both 
Somoza and the Sandinists. 
There are several features of the political economy of Nicaraguan cotton 
production which account for the rise of this radically new form of agricultural 
enterprise and are important for understanding the transformation of rural class 
structure and the continuing weakness of the cotton bourgeoisie. 
1. Land Tenure. A large proportion (typically more than fifty percent) of 
Nicaraguan cotton was grown on land rented from large landowners who had formerly 
divided their land between extensive grazing and subsistence cultivaton of maize 
by tenants under manorial tenure (Dorner and Quiros, 1973:228). The importance 
of renting has several consequences. It tended to favor large units since 
traditional landownership patterns were highly concentrated and absentee owners 
preferred to deal with a few wealthy and solvent large tenants than numerous 
improverished and precariously financed small farmers. Second capital tended to 
be considerably more liquid than in many agrarian systems since unprofitable 
acreage was not rented and hence the owner enterpreneur tended to respond to 
short run economic and political changes. After the revolution while coffee 
production exceeded its prerevolutionary levels, cotton area declined to less 
than half its customary prerevolutionary peak as large growers refrained from 
committing capital in an unstable political environment (Nicaragua, CIERA, 
1982:23). Capital not tied to land could be readily deployed to more profitable 
sectors of the economy and the relative liquidity of the cotton growers lead to a 
concern with short term profitability and an orientation to the rationalization 
of production not found .in the traditional coffee economy. Cotton growers were 
first and foremost businessmen not land owners. 
2. Credit. Cotton cultivation was entirely dependent on credit from the 
Banco Nacional which in turn was controlled by Somoza. Lending policies like the 
land ownership pattern favored large growers over small and facilitated the 
concentration of land.8 The Bank's role in production was clearly oriented to 
maximize productive efficiency, at least on the large units favored by the bank, 
and after 1960 available credit was' closely tied to yield placing further 
pressure on growers to rationalize production (Brooks, 1967:194). The role of 
the national bank also made the grower extremely sensitive to swings in 
government policy and placed the government in turn in an acute need for credit 
to subsidize what rapidly became the country's largest industry. Like so many 
other industries in the Somozas' Nicaragua the cotton economy became a kind of 
state capitalism with the new agrarian bourgeoisie highly dependent on both 
government policy and the international investment climate. The independence and 
freedom of action of the cotton bourgeoisie was severely restricted by the 
central role of the national bank in cotton finance. 
3. Pesticides. The largest single cost in Nicaraguan cotton production was 
pesticides which made the dramatic transformation of the agrarian economy 
possible in the first place. Pesticide costs in the early period of the boom 
typically represented 25 per cent of production Initially pesticides 
were applied liberally with little concern for the apppropriate quantities or the 
target pest and the sales efforts of the pesticide manufacturers rather than the 
exact nature of the pest was the major determinant of sales (Fernandez, 
1971:126). Pesticides were controlled by five foreign firms the largest of which 
was the Hercules Chemical corporation and sales incentives and highly paid agents 
stimulated massive use of the chemicals (~u"iez, no date: 49). Although initially 
the applications were successful the growers soon found themselves on the 
familiar "pesticide treadmill" in which the original pests developed resistance 
to pesticides; new pests move into the ecological niche created by the absence 
of predators and the decline of the original pest; ever increasing amounts of 
pesticides are necessary, and yields begin to decline dramatically. Although 
integrated pest management schemes based on restricted applications, and 
biological control techniques were tried they invariably broke down in the 
atmosphere of laissez faire predation which dominated the Somozas' Nicaragua 
(Swezey and Daxl, no date). Although the external effects of the pesticide 
treadmill including up to 3,000 acute poisoning episodes a year, a dramatic 
increase in malaria cases due to anopheles resistence, and massive human tissue 
burdens were disastrous they had relatively little political significance in 
Somoza's Nicaragua where occupational safety and public health were, to say the 
least, hardly major governmental concerns (~u?fez, no date: 99-105). 
Of greater importance politically was the increasing financial burden placed 
on the growers by the ever increasing demand for pesticide, especially after the 
rapid run up of petrochemical prices after the 1973 oil shock. Between 1972 and. 
1975 pesticide prices increased 130 per cent, while cotton prices remained 
relatively constant (Swezey and Daxl, no date:12). Oligopolistic control of the 
pesticide market gave the chemical firms a decisive advantage over the growers. 
Once hooked the cotton growers had to pay almost any amount to maintain the 
pesticide habit. By 1977-78 the cost of all imported inputs for cotton 
production, the largest of which was for pesticides, was greater than the export 
earnings for cotton (Swezey and Daxl, no date:12). The result was the rapid 
accumulation of foreign debt, a development in which Nicaragua was a pioneer, and 
an additional squeeze on the growers. 
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4. Exports. Credit and pesticide prices were both controlled by external 
agencies-the Somozas' National Bank and foreign multinationals, respectively. 
Marketing, ginning and export of the crop were also largely out of the hands of 
the growers themselves. Much of the crop was sold on futures contracts to 
speculators and ginning, as well as many future contracts, were controlled by 
only 28 firms. Export was in the hands of 16 foreign firms, mostly American and 
Japanese (~uzez, no date:25, 46-47). Although wealthy by Nicaraguan or even 
American standards the growers were no match for Somoza, the ginning firms, the 
American chemical companies or the exporting houses. Caught between the Banco 
Nacional, the Hercules Chemical Company, and Mitsui's exporters the cotton 
bourgeoisie could be forgiven if it felt more like the exploited 19th century 
French peasantry than a group of millionaire businessmen. Unstable prices in the 
early 70s led to efforts to form a growers association modeled after El 
Salvador's but Somoza proposed state, which is to say Somoza, control of the 
marketing of cotton. This unresolved conflict led to increasing political 
tension and in the late 70s, to an increasingly militant anti-Somoza position on 
the part of the growers (Baumeister et al., 1983:67-68). 
5. Mechanization and rationalization of production. Given the financial 
environment in which the cotton bourgeoisie functioned it is not surprising that 
cotton cultivation rapidly took on the appearance of an industrial rather than an 
agrarian undertaking. Tractors were introduced on a large scale on the larger 
farms and dramatically increased productivity. Planes were used on the larger 
farms for pesticide application although smaller farms seem to have been able to 
survive quite well with hand application from portable tanks (Fernandez, 
1971:127). By the 1960's an acute labor shortage during the harvest led to 
introduction of automatic harvesters which by 1967 accounted for as much as 
twenty per cent of the crop (Dorner and Quiros, 1973:226). Cotton cultivation 
absorbed 96.5% of fertilizers used in Nicaragua (~almero/n, 1978: 48). Despite the 
apparent economics of scale in the use of expensive machinery it is surprising 
that production costs were no lower on large estate than on small (Belli, 
1968:82). Nicaraguan production was considerably more mechanized than anywhere 
else in Central America. The combination of mechanization, fertilizer and, of 
course, pesticides produced the highest yields in the world for nonirrigated 
land, twice the level of yields in the Southern United States (Brooks, 1967:208). 
Almost all of the capital inputs in cotton occur at the beginning of the crop 
cycle and after the fields have been plowed, fertilized and sprayed much of the 
growers capital is tied up in the crops standing in the field. The entire 
investment is liquidated at each harvest and the entrepreneur tries to fulfill 
his contract and his debt with the national bank. The structure of capital 
inputs then further encourages an extreme orientation toward short run profit 
maximization and incteases the grower's financial exposure. 
Despite the fertile volcanic soils of the Pacific coastal region, abundant 
sunshine, ideal growing conditions and highly efficient production the social 
organization of Nicaraguan cotton growing ultimately depended on a super 
exploited labor force and the resulting low labor costs. Low cost labor depended 
on the maintenance of a rigid, repressive social and political order that 
guaranteed continued high rates of rural landlessness and unemployement. Since 
labor costs for a typical farm of 200 manzanas represented more than half of 
total costs (Belli, 1968:83) and since price and capital inputs are both beyond 
the control of the producer any substantial increase in labor costs would have 
sunk the cotton bourgeiosie. Average wage rates in the 1970's in cotton 
harvesting were 50 cents per hundred weight and an efficient picker could manage 
200 pounds a day (Deere and Marchetti, 1981 : 63). Even an increase to a minimum 
wage of say a modest two dollars a day would have destroyed the Nicaraguan 
growers competitive position and with increasing pesticide prices the situation 
becomes even worse. This' is precisely what occurred immediately after the 
Sandinist revolution when agricultural wages doubled (Deere and Marchetti, 
1981:63). A slight increase in labor costs from what seems an incredibly low 
level produced a move to mechanize in the mid sixties. lo Furthermore, labor 
requirements are concentrated almost entirely in the three month harvest period 
from December to April and a considerable army of sub-employed must be available 
to meet this seasonal demand. After the revolution when land reform and 
controlled food prices had established a minimum standard of living for both 
urban and rural populations labor could be had for the harvest only by relying on 
demonstrations of international or national solidarity through volunteer labor. 
Despite the appearance of capitalist forms in the labor and capital markets 
labor, although formally free, remained a factor of production bound to a 
coercive political system. The secret of the wealth of ~icara~ua w s not cotton, 
but repression. 
Cotton and Class Conflict 
The structural imperatives of Nicaraguan cotton production produced a 
peculiar form of agrarian bourgeoisie. In 1971 some 2,600 Nicaraguans produced 
cotton but half the planted area was controlled by approximately 250 family 
groups (Nuffez, no date:129-153) who could have formed the nucleus of either a 
cohesive agrarian oligarchy along the lines of Guatemala or El Salvadore or a 
modernizing entrepreneurial class along the lines of Costa Rica. Instead it 
produced neither. The considerable wealth accumulated in the cotton sector did 
not translate into political power or even to hegemony within the cotton sector 
itself. Some of the largest growers did combine with merchant capital to 
establish a new financial group based on the Banco ~icara6ense (BANIC), founded 
in 1953 in a successful effort to deploy their capital into other areas of the 
economy. Nevertheless, cotton producers, large and small, remained caught among 
the Somoza controlled National Bank, the multinational chemical firms and the 
great exporting houses and their political leaders demanded direct control over 
marketing and export. The response of the national cotton commission, CONAL, 
urging greater state control was not welcome especially since'the commission was 
headed by General Rodriquez Somoza (Baumeister, 1982:36). Alfonso Robelo 
Callejas a millionaire businessman and prominent Somoza opponent found the base 
of support for his Nicaraguan Democratic Movement among the cotton growers of 
Leon and Chinandega. He led his organization into alliance with the Sandinists 
and served as a member of the first post revolutionary junta. Pedro Antonio 
 lando oh scion of one of the prominent cotton growing families involved in the 
organization of BANIC is now a Vice Minister of Argiculture in the current (and 
more radical) Government of National Reconstruction. In El Salvador and 
Guatemala the agrarian bourgeoisie is the core of reactionary ruling coalitions. 
In Nicaragua a substantial class fraction joined the revolution. But the 
weakness of the cotton bourgeoisie and its willingness to join temporary 
coalitions in opposition to Somoza should not be permitted to disguise its 
complex class interests. Without Somoza or his equivalent there would have been 
no land concentration, no bank loans to big growers, and, above all, no depressed 
labor market to guarantee that the cotton in the fields would be converted into 
bankable profits. After the revolution some growers have continued operating but 
large numbers have "decapitalized" stopped production or left the country 
(~ollins, 1982:43). Alfonso Robelo is now with the counterrevolutionary forces 
in Costa Rica. 
The cotton revolution also produced a new class of semi-proletarians who 
were much closer to a true proletariat than the resident or near resident labor 
force of the traditional coffee estate. Cabarrus (1977:466) refers to the 
agrarian workforce of Posoltega in the Pacific cotton department of Chinadandega 
as an "agricultural proletariat por excelence." Given the capital intensivity of 
production and the extraordinarily high yields in the cotton zone provision of 
subsistence plots to insure a captive labor force was uneconomic and land rents 
were far beyond the means of even the wealthiest middle peasant. As a result 
lands of the cotton belt were rapidly stripped of their peasant occupants who had 
held lands in precarious tenure while supplying labor for the extensive cattle 
ranches which had dominated the coastal lowlands before cotton. The expansion of 
cotton acreage, which went from less than 24 thousand manzanas (1 manzana = .70 
hectares) in 1950-51 to almost 200 thousand manzanas in 1965 and peaked 
temporarily at over 300 thousand manzanas in 1977-1978 just before the 
revolution, corresponded directly to the decline in subsistence crops, 
particularly maize and beans (Baumeister et al., 1983:22). As Dorner and Quiros 
(1973:229) note, "Cotton acreage expanded almost exclusively at the expense of 
the area in basic grain production." As a result Nicaragua shifted from a net 
exporter to a net importer of grains between 1953-57 and 1963-1967 (Dorner and 
Quiros, 1973:229). Those few farmers who remained were wiped out by pests 
fleeing the clouds of pesticides enveloping the cotton fields. Foodstuff 
production rapidly became uneconomic in the cotton zone. Land expropriation and 
the separation of the peasantry from independent access to the mode of 
production, which had taken place in El Salvador coffee areas in the 1870s, had 
begun, but had not been completed, in the Segovia's coffee belt in 1910-1920, now 
finally reached its conclusion in the Nicaraguan cotton zone in the 1960s. 
Many of these displaced peasants moved to the cities of the cotton zone or 
to Managua where they joined a growing number of peasants forced off the land by 
population pressure to form the shanty town barrios that are the dominant feature 
of Nicaragua's urban landscape. Between 1950 and 1960 Managua's population grew 
from 98,000 to 234,000; Chinadega grew from 12,000 to 22,000; ~e&, from 30,000 
to 45,000 (Herrera, 1980:618). Nor were these displaced peasants absorbed by the 
rapidly expanding ~icaraguan economy. Nicaragua's industrial development was 
closely tied to the cotton export sector and industries such as pesticide, 
fertilizer and agricultural implement manufacture developed rapidly while such 
traditional employers as the handicraft production of shoes and leather goods 
went into virtual eclipse. Industrial production of agricultural inputs was 
based on the final assembly of imported intermediary goods and in some cases, 
such as the manufacture of pesticides , amounted to little more than mixing 
imported chemicals with Nicaraguan water. l1 On the forward linkage side cotton 
gins, oil seed processing plants and textile factories were all relatively 
capital intensive and provided little employment. l2 Overall agricultural export 
led development did little to absorb the agricultural surplus labor and the 
result was an immense informal sector which came to be the most numerous stratum 
in urban areas (Nuzez, 1981: 11). 
Nor could the surplus labor be absorbed in agriculture. The capitalist 
transformation in agriculture stopped short of creating the stable plantation 
proletariat of the banana zones of Honduras and Costa Rica and instead created a 
migratory semi-proletariat which could find employment only in the three month 
cotton harvests. The year round labor force of a coffee estate was largely 
unnecessary in cotton. The mechanization of cultivating, planting and spraying 
reduced the year round force to a small staff of technicians and tractor drivers, 
but the concentrated harvest'demands of an annual like cotton required immense 
labor inputs in a relatively brief period. By 1960 demand for harvest labor 
amounted to some 81,000 workers or 37.3 per cent of. the economically active 
population; by 1965 it had reached the incredible level of 203,000 workers, or 
71.2 per cent of the economically active population in agriculture'. Despite the 
mechanization of a third of the harvest in the late sixties by 1973 almost 
203,000 workers were still employed in the cotton harvest. Even in the peak year 
of 1965 only one tenth as many permanent as harvest workers were employed in 
cotton (salmer&n, 1978: 80; ~usez, no date: 53). Given the decline of subsistence 
cultivation in the principal Pacific Coast cotton departments, Leon and 
Chinandega, and the parallel growth of the urban population it appears that many 
of these agricultural workers spent the long o£f season in the marginal districts 
of the major cities staying alive as best they-could. Given the relatively brief 
period of employment and the prevailing wages it is, mathematically, impossible 
to maintain an adequate standard of living on cotton wages alone (~uzez, no 
date:64). ~almer6n (1978:Table 49, no pagination) reports that only 24 per cent 
of the population of Leon and Chinandega could be said to have had a nutricious 
diet; another 22 per cent had a barely sufficient diet while the remainder (54 
per cent) had insufficient food. Working conditions on the cotton estates were 
if anything even worse than the coffee estates. Labor contractors were paid by 
the truck load for rounding up workers and transporting them to the fields in the 
same vehicles used to take the cotton away after the harvest. Harvest workers 
were stuffed into barracks shelves with roughly the room per person of an 
Atlantic slave ship; fed rice and beans only if they picked 100 pounds or more of 
cotton per day; deprived of any semblance of privacy or sanitary facilities; 
exposed to the unrestricted use of pesticides, and driven to back-breaking labor 
in the 110 degree heat of the Pacific Coast by man killing piece rates. Malaria, 
dysentery, and diarrheal disease were endemic; intestinal parasites, almost 
universal (~uxez, no date: 97-105). Medical care, occupational safety 
regulations, rest periods, grievance committees or any of the guarantees of basic 
labor legislation were nonexistent. By 1970 there were only 22 union locals of 
agricultural workers with a total membership of 1,158 out of a total economically 
active population in agriculture of 237,327 (~almerck, 1978: 99). 
The seasonal labor demand and the dispersion of the workforce to the cities 
and countryside after the harvest significantly reduced the possibilities for the 
formation of the class conscious poletariat and powerful labor unions of banana 
plantations workers in Costa Rica and Honduras. Nevertheless, the cotton workers 
had some organizational advantages, particularly in comparison with coffee 
workers under manorial organization. The overwhelming demand for harvest labor 
which overlapped with peak demand in the sugar and coffee harvests, created the 
paradox of acute labor shortages in the midst of general unemployment. Honduras 
and Salvadoran workers migrated in large numbers to fill the gap and, of course, 
mechanization represented a solution for the larger growers with access to 
capital. During peak periods of the boom when profits were high, labor markets 
tight, and planters desperate for labor, the threat of a work stoppage should 
have given considerable leverage to worker organizations. The capitalist 
rationalization of production eliminated some, but not all, of those manorial 
ties between planter and worker which had contributed to the stability of the 
earlier system. Although company stores (comisariatos) peristed in the cotton 
zone, as they did in the coffee regions, planters saw no reason to make provision 
for subsistence plots for their workers and had no obligations whatsoever in the 
off season. As ~almer6n (1978: 94) notes, "Cotton production modified the 
patron-worker re1ationsh.i~ substituting the buying and selling of labor power in 
an impersonal market for the individual. personal relationship which had existed 
between land owner and peon." The remaining connection between anonymous worker 
and his employer was the piece rate paid entirely on the basis of the weight of a 
cotton sack at the end of the day. The cotton system also severed, for most 
workers, any remaining connection to subsistence production and left them fully 
exposed to capitalist market forces. Although some workers returned to 
subsistence plots in the off season many others were fully dependent on wage 
labor and were, theref ore, unemployed wage laborers rather than peasant farmers 
when they were not in the cotton fields. In Nicaraguan coffee production'workers 
were left in more direct control over the land then they were anywhere else in 
Central America; in cotton production the opposite was the case.. In the off 
season many cotton workers congregated in the cities of the cotton belt and in 
Managua. To a surprising extent Nicaragua's agricultural proletariat was urban. 
Despite these organizational advantages and the objective need for 
protection from an extraordinarily exploitative production system no strong 
unions formed in the agricultural sector until the organization of the 
Association of Rural Workers (ATC) in March 1978 under the leadership of the 
Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN) (Black, 1981:273). The reason for 
this lack of unionization was not lack of incentives or organizers but 
repression. All signs of mobilizaton on the part of the rural work force were 
brutally repressed by the National Guard. One early attempt to form a rural 
union in the cotton growing Department of Chinandega resulted in 300 dead at the 
hands of the Guard (Deere and Marchetti, 1981: 48). . In the 1970s the Educational 
Center for Agrarian Advancement (CEPA), a church related agrarian educational 
organization, was the target of equally brutal tactics when it began to organize 
11 base communities" of rural workers to discuss their common problems in a 
religous context," (Collins, 1982: 25). In 1978 in the coffee town of Diriamba, 
the National Guard opened fire on a peaceful demonstration of rural workers 
organized to protest Somoza's assertion that imbalanced diet rather than poverty 
was the cause of hunger in rural areas (Collins, 1982: 26-27). As Collins 
(1982:75) observes, "For decades the shortage of workers during peak harvest 
periods should have given workers bargaining power to win higher pay and better 
working conditions. But actual repression or very substantial threat of 
repression by the National Guard thwarted that natural development." Cotton 
cultivation created the conditions for working class mobilization at the same 
time that its economic cultivation required the suppression of any labor demands 
by force of arms. In Honduras and Costa Rica the demands of proletarianized 
rural workers have been funneled into organized labor movements granted 
legitimacy by the state and insurrectional leadership has had limited success. 13 
In Nicaragua rural unions were impossible and insurrection the only alternative 
to inaction. 
Although the definitive history of the rural proletariat's participation in 
the final insurrection in 1978-79 remains to be written preliminary studies by 
Deere and Marchetti (1981), Black (1981), and Collins (1982) suggest that its 
role was considerable. Building on the work of CEPA the FSLN began organizing 
coffee workers in the Carazo and Masaya regions in the Pacific Coast coffee belt 
(Deere and Marchetti, 1981:50; Black, 1981:273; Collins, 1982:26). Significantly 
their organizing' efforts were focused on the'large, technically more advanced 
estates of the Coast where the ~anamerican Highway and an excellent network of 
local roads connect the market towns of Jinotepe, Diriamba and San Marcos to 
Managua and world markets. In the North Central coffee belt where memories of 
Sandino lingered but proletarianization was less advanced the FSLN adapted 
guerrilla tactics from the outset and staged its first major military action at 
Pancasan near the coffee trading center of Matagalpa in 1967. The organizing 
efforts rapidly spread to the cotton belt and by late 1977 "...the northern 
Pacific zone, completely dominated by cotton and sugar estates, was the most 
militant area in the country," (Collins, 1982: 26). The formation of the ATC in 
Diriamba in 1978 led directly to land invasions in Chinandega which had also 
experienced a series of land invasions in the sixties and early seventies under 
the impact of . the expanding cotton sector. During the September 1978 
insurrection which preceded the final battle for Nicaragua in May, June and July 
1979 "the ATC was able to convert itself into a powerful force of the FSLN, not 
only in building the armed struggle but in organizing political action by workers 
and peasants in rural areas. "I4 Although the insurrections of September 1978, as 
well as the final battles of liberation in 1979, were overwhelmingly urban it 
appears that many rural laborers who had been expelled from the cotton and coffee 
harvest participated actively. It was precisely in the poorest districts of the 
major cities where most displaced agricultural laborers collected, such as 
Subtiava in Leon or Monimbo in Masaya, where the most intense struggles took 
place both in the .78 insurrection and the final war of liberation. ~&ez et al. 
note that the timing of the insurrection follows the seasonal rythms of the 
agricultural cycle. The September insurrection- ends before the beginning of the 
harvest and the revolution resumes in May af ter the harvest cycle is complete. 15 
In the 1978 insurrection, where patterns of mass participation are clearest, four 
/ 
cities, Leon, Chinandega,  ste elf and Masaya became known as the "Guernicas" of 
Nicaragua as a result of the intense struggles between the citizenry of the 
poorer districts and the Guard. Two of these four, ~ e 6 n  and Chinandega, are the 
urban centers of the cotton belt and a third, Masaya, is on the border between 
the Tipitapa cotton belt and the Masaya-Carazo coffee zone. Nicaragua which 
might at first seem to be an exception to the conventional sociological wisdom 
that the peasantry is the decisive class in revolution may in fact be the 
exception that proves the rule. The predominantly urban Nicaraguan revolution 
may have involved substantial participation by a new rural proletariat swollen to 
overwhelming size by the dynamic growth of the cotton export sector. 16 
Although the exact role of the seasonal cotton proletariat in the Nicaraguan 
revolution remains to be clarified by future empirical research several tentative 
conclusions can be drawn concerning the links between cotton and revolution in 
Nicaragua. First, the development of the cotton export sector provided the 
impetus for a capitalist transformation of agricultural production which, because 
of the peculiarities of Nicaraguan history and geography, and never occurred in 
the coffee export sector. Second, the cotton bourgeoisie, divided between large 
growers allied with BANIC and smaller growers caught between exporters, pesticide 
firms and the national bank never provided the cohesive nucleus for an export 
oligarchy of the kind that dominated Salvador or Guatemala. Indeed the smaller 
growers under the leadership of the MDN and Alfonso Robelo moved into opposition 
to Somoza while the influential agribusinessmen of the BANIC group worried 
equally about unfair competition from Somoza and the FSLN. Third, the rural 
proletariat which began its development under the coffee system expanded greatly 
t 
as a result of the demands of cotton production to become the largest single 
class in the agrarian economy of Nicaragua and once organized under the direction 
of the ATC and the FSLN became an important, and perhaps decisive, force in the 
insurrection that demolished the National Guard and Somoza's regime. The 
explosive expansion of the Nicaraguan cotton export sector created a potentially 
revolutionary class, prevented its mobilization under moderate 'leadership, and 
fatally weakened its potential bourgeois opponents. The true Nicaraguan 
revolutionaries may have been the agribusinessmen of ~ e 6 n  and Chinandega. 
NOTES 
1. The relationship between the coffee bourgeoisie and the state in Central 
America as a whole is discussed extensively in the works of Edelberto 
Torres-Rivas (1971, 1981, 1983). On Costa Rica see Stone (1982); Salvador, 
Baloyra (1982); Guatemala, North American Congress on Latin America (1974); 
Honduras, Morris and Ropp (1977). On the Nicaraguan national guard see 
Millet (1977). The observation on Somoza's command of English is on page 55. 
2. The boom and its effects in Central America as a whole are described in 
Cardoso (1975) and Torres-Rivas (1975).. On Salvador see Trujillo (1981); 
Guatemala, Cambranes (1982); Costa Rica, Cardoso (1977). 
3 .  Wheelock (1978) demonstrates that the coffee bourgeoisie was not part of the 
two non-Somoza economic groups, the Banco Nicaragcense (BANIC) and the Banco 
, Amgrica (BANAMERICA) which dominated the prerevolutionary economy. The 
Calley Dagnall coffee firm became an important regional power in Matagalpa. 
4. Cardosa (1977) and Hall (1982) both emphasize the role of the small producer. 
Seligson (1982) presents an alternative view emphasizing land concentration 
.but his conclusions are based on indirect evidence from sales records. 
5. Holloway (1974) provides an excellent comparative analysis of Brazilian and 
Central American production techniques. Biechler (1970) documents the pace 
of technical change in the Guatemalan coffee industry. 
6. In Morelos the conflict was between expanding sugar haciendas and land owning 
peasant communities (Womack, 1968); in Peru it was between sheep raising 
indigenous communities and adjacent capitalist ranches (O'Shea, 1980). 
7. Coffee prices increased 1957-1963 creating a second coffee boom and restoring 
some limited dynamism to the coffee economy particularly in the North Central 
coffee region where the FSLN first found its rural base (David Kaimowitz, 
personal communication). 
8. Fernandez (1971:137) notes, "Currently the importance of the National Bank in 
financing cotton activity is such that it is apparent that, to a large 
extent, the bank determines the area of cotton to be planted via credit." 
9. Calculated from data presented in ~u%ez (no date:22). Data are for the 
1971-72 season. 
10. It could be argued that in the 9bsence of repression mechanization would have 
been even more rapid and the labor problem solved. This argument neglects 
two important considerations. First, in the financial squeeze the seventies 
capital was not readily available to purchase more machines and even if the 
capital would have been found it is not likely that the growers would have 
been the principal beneficiaries. A few very large growers or agribusiness 
corporations would have increasingly dominated agriculture. Whatever the 
merits of such a transformation from a purely economic standpoint it would 
have destroyed many growers without access to capital. 
11. ~almer6n (1978: 40). The manufacture of chemicals and petroleum derivatives 
(fertilizers) went from 3.69 er cent of industrial production in 1950 to 
22.10 per cent in 1974 (Salmer c? n, 1978:Table 10, no pagination). 
12. The entire domestic textile industry employed only 1,610 workers in all 
capacities; the cotton seed oil industry, only 992 (Baumeister et al., 
1983:14-15). 
13. In Honduras the decisive event in this process was the successful 1954 banana 
workers strike which established minimal rights for labor (Posas, 1981). In 
Costa Rica legitimacy came only after Communist influence in the banana 
workers union had been subdued and labor mobilization took place under 
government auspices (Seligson, 1982:74). 
14. ATC General Secretary Edgardo ~arcia in a speech to the ATC assembly. Quoted 
in Black, 1981:273. See ibid. for descriptions of land invasions. 
. . 
15. Lgpez et al., (1980: 185-186) note, "No sera' por casualidad entonces que el 
espacio econdmico de la guerra revolucionaria desatada en esos meses 
estuviese ubicado precisamente en 10s barrios de las ciudades de Lecfn, 
Chinandega, Masaya, Carazo, Matagalpa y  ste elf; es decir, en el mismo lugar 
en que en 10s meses de Abril a Octubre se concentran,esas mismas masas 
proletarizadas que son expulsados de 10s campos del algodon, azzcar y cafe:" 
16. But for an alternative view emphasizing the role of the informal sector see 
Nuzez (1981). Nunez attributes the revolution to a coalition between a new 
middle class of salaried professional technical and managerial workers, 
especially its potential members among students, and the informal sector. 
' Together they constitute the "third force." As the previous note makes 
clear, Nunez has argued both sides on this particular question. Actually the 
same people are involved since the informal sector consists of l'. . .las 
masas proletarizadas que son expulsadas de 10s campos. . . 11 
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